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The central notion of the Dutch drug policy has always been that the 
drug problem is primarily a public health issue. The policy never aimed 
at a total ban of drug use from society because this was considered a 
nonrealistic objective. Instead of eradication of drugs and drug use, it 
tries to prevent and limit the risks of the use of drugs users, their direct 
environment and society. This aim can be classified as harm reduction. 
At the same time, it controls drug-related nuisance and crime. For a long 
time, the tolerant policy towards drug users was controversial and 
deviated from other policies worldwide. The eye catcher of the drug 
policy is the phenomenon of the ‘coffee shop,’ café-like commercial 
public enterprises where the sale of cannabis to adult consumers is 
tolerated by police and prosecutor. Coffee shops have existed for more 
than 40 years and a regulatory system with an increasing number of 
rules developed in the course of time. The legal basis for the policy of 
tolerance lies in the discretionary power of the Public Prosecutor, the 
‘expediency principle.’ The coffee shop system is a typical example of the 
drug policy’s focus on health and welfare of users and its core concept of 
risk reduction. But it is only a halfway-regulated system. In this article, I 
will discuss the paradoxes and tensions that are inherent to the coffee 
shop system. I will also sketch the adverse developments that occurred in 
relation to the system. The system is a wicked problem for Dutch policy 
makers, who seek for a balance between the health principles of the 
policy and the need to enforce the Opium Act.  
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INTRODUCTION2
Coffee shops are a typical Dutch phenomenon. They are commercial 
enterprises where the sale of small amounts of cannabis to adult users is 
tolerated, which means that the police and the Public Prosecutor won’t 
arrest or prosecute the coffee shop owner for selling cannabis, although 
this is a criminal act according to the Dutch Opium Act.3 The user won’t 
be arrested for buying and possessing cannabis either.4 The first coffee 
shop started in 1968 in the city of Utrecht.5 There was no official 
tolerance policy back then, that’s why the coffee shops’ door was closed 
and customers had to knock on the door in order to enter the shop.6 A 
‘house dealer’ sold the cannabis and you could consume a coffee or a 
tea.7 The sale of cannabis by house dealers was not new; house dealers of 
cannabis were active at entertainment venues and music events and the 
police more and more applied an informal practice of tolerance.8 In the 
 2. Thank you to Karen Nelson from Michigan State University College of Law 
for her assistance with translations. 
 3. Wet van 12 mei 1928, Stb. 1928, art. 3 (Neth.). 
 4. Id.
 5. DERRICK BERGMAN, DE EERSTE COFFEESHOP VAN NEDERLAND, ROLLING
STONED (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.rollingstoned.nl/de-eerste-coffeeshop-van-
nederland/.
 6. Id.
 7. Id.
 8. A.C.M. Jansen, Hasj-coffeeshops als experiment, 19 JUSTITIËLE 
VERKENNINGEN 96 (1993); see generally DIRK J. KORF, DUTCH TREAT: FORMAL CONTROL 
AND ILLICIT DRUG USE IN THE NETHERLANDS 69-70 (1995); MARCEL DE KORT, TUSSEN
PATIËNT EN DELINQUENT, GESCHIEDENIS VAN HET NEDERLANDSE DRUGSBELEID [BETWEEN 
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1970s coffee shops in Amsterdam started their business: Mellow Yellow 
in 1972, the Bulldog in 1975.9 After a change in the Opium Act in 1976, 
coffee shops developed into open enterprises10 and they even got a 
formal function in the drug policy.11 They became one of the most salient 
features of the Dutch drug policy. Their number grew explosively in the 
1980s and 1990s.12 Since then, the policy towards them became more 
restrictive13 and the number slowly and gradually decreased to 582 in 
March 2015.14 All the policies and rules that were woven around the 
coffee shops in all these years really speak about the Dutch coffee shop 
system. The coffee shops of 2016 look like normal cafés where adults 
can walk in and buy and use cannabis.  
I. WHY DOES THE NETHERLANDS HAVE COFFEE SHOPS?
If we want to understand the reason for the existence of coffee shops, 
we have to go back in history and look at the attitude towards drugs and 
drug use in the Netherlands back in the 1970s and 1980s. An important 
year for the Dutch drug policy was 1976. The Opium Act was revised 
then after a period of reflections by several commissions15 and 
PATIENT AND DELINQUENT, THE HISTORY OF DRUG POLICY IN THE NETHERLANDS] 246-248
(1995) (with a report summary in English) 
 9. BERGMAN, supra note 5. 
 10. KORF, supra note 8, at 69–70.
 11. LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 1994-1995, File No 24077 3, 
DRUGBELEID, NOTA ‘HET NEDERLANDSE DRUGBELEID: CONTINUÏTEIT EN VERANDERING’
[DRUG POLICY IN THE NETHERLANDS, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE] 39 (Sept. 25, 1995); 
Margriet van Laar et al., Scheiding der markten en beleid ten aanzien van coffeeshops 
[Separation of Markets and Policy with Regard to Coffee Shops], in EVALUATIE VAN HET 
NEDERLANDSE DRUGSBELEID [EVALUATION OF THE DUTCH DRUG POLICY] 109, 112 
(Margriet van Laar & Marianne van Ooyen-Houben eds., 2009) (with a report summary 
in English).  
 12. Jansen, supra note 8, at 101.  
 13. van Laar et al., supra note 11, at 120; Marianne van Ooyen-Houben & 
Edward Kleemans, Drug Policy: The “Dutch Model”, 44 CRIME & JUST. 165, 196–202 
(2015).
 14. BERT BIELEMAN ET AL., COFFEESHOPS IN NEDERLAND 2014 (COFFEE SHOPS IN 
THE NETHERLANDS 2014) 9 (2015) (with a report summary in English). 
 15. DE KORT, supra note 8, at 186–201; Ed Leuw, Drugs and Drug Policy in the 
Netherlands, 14 CRIME & JUST. 229, 240, 243–47; Jaap van der Stel et al., Ontwikkeling 
van het Nederlandse drugsbeleid (The Development of the Dutch Drug Policy), in
EVALUATIE VAN HET NEDERLANDSE DRUGSBELEID EVALUATION OF THE DUTCH DRUG
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discussions in Parliament16 the use of drugs was no longer a criminal act. 
Possession of cannabis for personal use was reduced from a crime to a 
minor infraction of the law.17 But the most important change was that a 
distinction was made between two types of drugs: drugs with an 
unacceptable risk for the health (‘hard drugs’ like heroin, LSD, 
amphetamine or cocaine) and, on the other hand, drugs with less risks 
(‘soft drugs,’ cannabis being the most important one).18 By making a 
distinction between cannabis and other, more harmful drugs, a 
differentiated judicial reaction could be given to crimes with regard to 
hard drugs or cannabis. Offenses were punished more severely when 
hard drugs were involved.19
The change was considered necessary because of radical changes in 
the drug situation in the Netherlands in the 1960s. The use of drugs, 
which was a criminal act then, and especially the use of cannabis, LSD 
and amphetamine, increased substantially.20 In the 1970s, the use of 
heroin (and the international organized trafficking of heroin) started 
demanding a lot of attention because of the severe problems with 
addiction and crime related to it.21 The initial reaction to all this new drug 
use was repression,22 but a big difference was noticed between the 
cannabis users on the one hand, who were well-integrated members of 
society and functioned in a socially normal way, and heroin users on the 
other hand, who were often addicted and marginalized (the ‘junkies’).23
This soon led to an informal tolerance policy towards cannabis users: 
they were left as they were by police and Public Prosecutor.24 During the 
POLICY] 45, 49–50 (Margriet van Laar & Marianne van Ooyen-Houben eds., 2009) (with 
report summary in English). 
 16. DE KORT, supra note 8, at 243–46; Leuw, supra note 15, at 248. 
 17. van der Stel et al., supra note 15, at 50; KORF, supra note 8, at 43. 
 18. Leuw, supra note 15, at 231; van der Stel et al., supra note 15, at 50. 
 19. Karin Monshouwer et al., Buying Cannabis in ‘Coffee Shops,’ 30 DRUG &
ALCOHOL REV. 148, 149 (2011); KORF, supra note 8, at 43.
 20. DE KORT, supra note 8, at 162–75; van der Stel et al., supra note 15, at 47. 
 21. DE KORT, supra note 8, at 228–30, 234–35; KORF, supra note 8, at 45.
 22. See KORF, supra note 8, at 61; van der Stel et al., supra note 15, at 47; DE 
KORT, supra note 8, at 178–79.
 23. KORF, supra note 8, at 61–63.
 24. van der Stel et al., supra note 15, at 45, 48; DE KORT, supra note 8, at 179–83,
228.
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1970s, the Public Prosecutor was dropping the majority of cannabis 
charges.25
This differentiated, more lenient attitude towards cannabis and 
cannabis users was consolidated in the Opium Act of 1976.26 The aim of 
the policy with regard to cannabis users since then has been to prevent 
them from becoming marginalized, stigmatized, and criminalized and to 
reduce the risk that they start using more harmful ‘hard drugs’ like heroin 
or amphetamine.27
This opened the way for a tolerant attitude of police and Public 
Prosecutor towards house dealers of cannabis at music events and in 
public premises, and later in coffee shops.28 By tolerating sales outlets 
where cannabis users can buy their cannabis quietly and safely, users will 
be kept away from the hands of criminal street drug dealers who also sell 
hard drugs.29
This is the key function of coffee shops in the Dutch cannabis policy: 
contributing to a separation of the hard drugs consumer market in the 
streets and the cannabis consumer market. Coffee shops are, thus, a 
consequence of the Dutch cannabis policy, which aims at normalization 
of users, is primarily focused on the health of users, and which wants to 
keep cannabis users away from hard drugs. This is embedded in a health-
oriented drug policy30 in which the ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sports plays the coordinating role.31 Whereas the reason to tolerate coffee 
shops sounds as a rational argument, there were also ideological motives 
that played a role in the background. In the 1960s and 1970s it was quite 
‘bourgeois’ and old fashioned to condemn cannabis use – those were the 
days of self-determination and freedom in which the state should play a 
 25. KORF, supra note 8, at 54. 
 26. DE KORT, supra note 8, at 246.
 27. Id. at 247; van Laar et al., supra note 11, at 110. 
 28. DE KORT, supra note 8, at 247–48. 
 29. Id. at 247-48; van Laar et al., supra note 11, at 111, 117; LOWER HOUSE OF 
THE PARLIAMENT 1994-1995, supra note 11, at 6, 37. 
 30. See TIM BOEKHOUT VAN SOLINGE, DEALING WITH DRUGS IN EUROPE, AN 
INVESTIGATION OF EUROPEAN DRUG CONTROL EXPERIENCES: FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS 
AND SWEDEN 24 (2004). 
 31. van der Stel et al., supra note 15, at 50; KORF, supra note 8, at 50. 
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modest role, especially in the case of cannabis, which was seen as a 
relatively harmless drug.32
The settlement of coffee shops was a bottom-up development.33
Individuals took the initiative to start a commercial cannabis outlet. The 
official policy followed and shaped the conditions. The phenomenon of 
the coffee shop started in the bigger cities.34 The development was 
facilitated by the change of law in 1976, which followed a growing 
practice of tolerance with regard to cannabis use in the years before.35 In 
the 1980s and 1990s coffee shops were initiated all over the country.36 In 
1995, the number of coffee shops was estimated at 1100-1200.37 They 
prospered especially in municipalities near the German and Belgian 
border.38
II. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE POLICY TO TOLERATE COFFEE SHOPS
We have to make a distinction between the national and the local 
level. On the national level, the policy with regards to enforcement is that 
coffee shops are ‘tolerated.’39 This means that there is no enforcement of 
the law, despite the fact that this is legally and practically possible.40
Strictly speaking, coffee shops commit a crime against the Opium Act 
when they sell cannabis, because the sale of cannabis as well as the 
 32. Henk G. van de Bunt, Hoe stevig zijn de fundamenten van het 
cannabisbeleid?[How Strong Are the Fundamentals of Dutch Cannabis Policy], 32 
JUSTITIËLE VERKENNINGEN 10, 11–14 (2006). 
 33. DE KORT, supra note 8, at 254; Jansen, supra note 8, at 97–98, 102. 
 34. Jansen, supra note 8, at 98. 
 35. van der Stel et al., supra note 15, at 48; KORF, supra note 8, at 61; DE KORT, 
supra note 8, at 254. 
 36. Jansen, supra note 8, at 100–01. 
 37. LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 1994-1995, supra note 11, at 37. 
 38. See M. van Ooyen-Houben & M. van der Giessen, Eerdere interventies in het 
coffeeshopaanbod [Earlier Interventions in the Supply by Coffee Shops], in 
COFFEESHOPS, EN LOKALE MARKT, EVALUATIE VAN HET BESLOTEN CLUB- EN HET 
INGEZETENENCRITERIUM VOOR COFFEESHOPS [COFFEE SHOPS, TOURISTS AND LOCAL 
MARKETS, EVALUATION OF THE PRIVATE CLUB AND THE RESIDENCE CRITERION] 34–35 (M. 
van Ooyen-Houben et al. eds., 2014) (with report summary in English). 
 39. Aanwijzing Opiumwet (Designation Opium Act) 1 Mar. 2015, § 2.2 (2015). 
 40. See LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 2004-2005, File No 30050 1-2, 
HANDHAVEN EN GEDOGEN, RAPPORT [ENFORCEMENT AND TOLERANCE, REPORT] 11 (Mar. 
18, 2005).  
2017] The Dutch Coffee Shop System, Tensions and Benefits 629
possession of (large amounts of) cannabis is forbidden.41 But this 
criminal act is not investigated by the police, nor prosecuted by the 
Public Prosecutor.42 Coffee shops can do their business without being 
arrested. Not that the police turns a blind eye to the coffee shops, no, it is 
the formal and explicit policy.  
The judicial basis for the tolerance is the principle of discretionary 
powers of the Public Prosecutor, the “expediency principle.” This 
principle, laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, gives the Public 
Prosecutor the power to refrain from prosecution of offences if this 
serves a general public interest.43 This principle is systematically applied 
in the Dutch coffee shop policy. In the case of coffee shops, the general 
public interest is found in preserving public health (by a separation of 
markets) and public order (regulated sale instead of criminal drug 
markets).44 For this higher public interest, coffee shops are left un-
arrested and un-prosecuted.  
This is explicitly stated in the Directive for Opium Act crimes for the 
Public Prosecutor: 
The basis for the policy of tolerance lies in the balancing of interests 
which the importance of enforcement must give way to a more 
identifiable public interest. In the context of the drug policy is this 
higher interest found in public health (separation of markets) and the 
public order. It is therefore not to detect a positive decision and to 
continue regardless of available capacity.45
The tolerance is, however, bound to strict rules. In the course of time, 
when more and more coffee shops opened their doors, rules for tolerance 
developed in practice, initially in the city of Amsterdam.46 In 1991, the 
National Office of the Public Prosecutor decided that these rules would 
be applicable to coffee shops nationwide.47 Coffee shops would only be 
tolerated when they do not advertise (apart from a minor reference on the 
shop); when they have no hard drugs in the shop and do not sell hard 
 41. Art. 3 Wet RO (Neth.). 
 42. Aanwijzing Opiumwet (Designation Opium Act) 1 Mar. 2015, § 2.2 (2015). 
 43. Art. 167, lid 2, Sv. (Neth.); Art. 242, lid 2 Sv. (Neth.). 
 44. Aanwijzing Opiumwet (Designation Opium Act) 1 Mar. 2015, § 2.2 (2015). 
 45. Id.
 46. Jansen, supra note 8, at 98–99. 
 47. van der Stel et al., supra note 15, at 50. 
630 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.3 
drugs; when they do not cause public nuisance in their direct vicinity; 
when they do not sell to or give access to youngsters; and when they do 
not sell large quantities of cannabis to a customer per transaction, which 
means quantities larger than suitable for personal use.48 Later it was also 
specified that coffee shops are not allowed to have more than 500 grams 
of cannabis in stock and that they may not serve alcohol.49 In addition, 
since 2013, coffee shops are not allowed to give access to non-residents 
of the Netherlands.50 With regard to youngsters, the criterion was 
specified in 1994: no customers under age 18 are allowed in coffee 
shops.51 With regard to the quantities that can be sold per transaction: this 
was 30 grams, but it was reduced to 5 grams in 1994.52 The national 
rules, or “criteria for tolerance” are described explicitly in the Directive 
Opium Act for the Public Prosecutor.53
The coffee shop policy, however, is implemented and gets its concrete 
shape on the local level.54 Local authorities take some basic decisions 
about coffee shops and they play, in fact, a key role. First of all, the 
mayor, together with the Public Prosecutor and the Chief of the police in 
the city, decide whether they will allow the establishment of (one or 
more) coffee shops in their municipality.55 Every coffee shop needs a 
license from the mayor.56 If the local authorities decide not to allow 
coffee shops, no licenses will be given out and no coffee shop will be 
 48. Aanwijzing Opiumwet (Designation Opium Act) 1 Mar. 2015, § 3.4 (2015).  
 49. Id. § 1. 
 50. Id.
 51. Id.; LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 1994-1995, supra note 11, at 37. 
 52. Aanwijzing Opiumwet (Designation Opium Act) 1 Mar. 2015, § 3.4 (2015); 
LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 1994-1995, supra note 11, at 37. 
 53. Aanwijzing Opiumwet (Directive Opium Act) 3 Jan. 2015, § 3.4 (2015). 
 54. MIRJAM VAN HET LOO ET AL., CANNABIS POLICY, IMPLEMENTATION AND 
OUTCOMES 20-21 (2003); M. van Ooyen-Houben & A. Mein, Wie heeft hier de regie? 
Coffeeshops tussen lokaal, nationaal en internationaal beleid [Who is in Charge Here, 
Coffee Shops Between Local, National and International Drug Policies], 41(2) 
JUSTITIËLE VERKENNINGEN 55-79 (2015); M.M.J. van Ooyen-Houben, Coffeeshops: 
ontstaan en beleid [Coffee Shops: Origin and Policy], in HET BESLOTEN CLUB- EN HET 
INGEZETENENCRITERIUM VOOR COFFEESHOPS THE PRIVATE CLUB AND THE RESIDENCE 
CRITERION FOR COFFEE SHOPS] 34-35 (M.M.J. van Ooyen-Houben et al.  
eds., 2012) (with report summary in English). 
 55. Aanwijzing Opiumwet (Directive Opium Act) 3 Jan. 2015, § 2.3 (2015). 
 56. Id. 
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tolerated in the municipality.57 The majority of municipalities in the 
Netherlands, especially the smaller ones, have such a local “zero policy” 
of not allowing any coffee shop within their municipality, 69,7% in 
2014.58 The others do allow coffee shops and give out licenses for a 
certain number of them.59 The local authorities also decide how many 
coffee shops they will allow.60 Most municipalities limit the number of 
coffee shops to a certain maximum.61 No more licenses will be given out 
by the mayor when this maximum is reached.62
Sometimes a municipality changes its local coffee shop policy from a 
“zero policy” to a policy of allowing coffee shops. This was for instance 
the case in the medium-sized city of Lelystad in 2011 when local 
authorities decided to give room for one coffee shop after a long period 
of forbidding coffee shops.63 The other way round is also possible. When 
Bergen op Zoom-Roosendaal, a medium-sized city near the Belgian 
border, decided to leave its policy of tolerating coffee shops and 
introduced a “zero policy” in 2008, all eight coffee shops had to close 
their doors.64  The mayor has to render account for the local coffee shop 
policy to the city council.65
When the local authorities decide to allow coffee shops, the mayor 
can apply additional local rules for the coffee shops.66 A wide spread 
local rule is that no coffee shop is allowed within a certain distance 
(mostly 250 meters) from a secondary school.67 The cities of Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam, for instance, apply such a “distance criterion.” Rotterdam 
introduced this criterion in 2009, and, as a consequence, 16 coffee shops 
 57. Id. 
 58. BIELEMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 13. 
 59. Id. at 13-14. 
 60. Aanwijzing Opiumwet (Directive Opium Act) 3 Jan. 2015, § 2.3 (2015). 
 61. BIELEMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 14. 
 62. Id.
 63. D. J. KORF ET AL., COFFEESHOP, OVERLAST EN ILLEGALE MARKT: DE GEVOLGEN 
VAN DE KOMST VAN EEN COFFEESHOP IN LELYSTAD [COFFEE SHOPS, PUBLIC NUISANCE AND 
ILLEGAL MARKET, THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COFFEE SHOP IN THE 
CITY OF LELYSTAD] 11 (2013).  
 64. van Ooyen-Houben & van der Giessen, supra note 38, at 39. 
 65. van Ooyen-Houben, supra note 54, at 34.
 66. Id. at 35. 
 67. BIELEMAN ET AL., supra note 58, at IV. 
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had to close.68 Amsterdam has applied such a criterion since 2014 and 
coffee shops there have to close their doors.69 Another local rule that 
some municipalities apply is that a coffee shop is not allowed to serve 
customers on a terrace, or that it is only allowed to be open at certain 
hours.70
Local authorities also decide how they will enforce the criteria in 
daily practice, and they have to agree on sanctions.71 The mayor plays an 
important role in enforcement. He can apply administrative sanctions, 
like a temporary or definitive closure of a coffee shop when it does not 
comply with the rules.72 This authority of the mayor is laid down in the 
Opium Act.73 Additionally, the Public Prosecutor can prosecute a coffee 
shop when it does not comply with the rules, but administrative sanctions 
have priority (in principle).74 Police and municipal authorities in co-
operation mostly carry out controls of compliance in the coffee shops.75
They take place unannounced periodically, or in reaction to complaints 
or speculations about noncompliance.76 The frequency of controls is 
determined on the local level.77
The criteria and the sanctions must be described in a local 
‘enforcement plan’ so that everybody is informed about the local policy 
and knows what to expect. This is important with regard to the necessary 
transparency and predictability of authorities; coffee shops must know 
how to behave and they must be able to trust the authorities. The judge 
will weigh this when a case of noncompliance comes to court.78
 68. van Ooyen-Houben & van der Giessen, supra note 38, at 41. 
 69. M. W. VAN LAAR & M.M.J. VAN OOYEN-HOUBEN, NATIONALE DRUG
MONITOR, JAARBERICHT 2016 [NATIONAL DRUG MONITOR, ANNUAL REPORT 2016] 59 
(2016) (with report summary in English). 
 70. BIELEMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 25. 
 71. Id. at 26. 
 72. Wet van 12 mei 1928, Stb. 1928, art. 13b (Neth.). 
 73. Id.
 74. van Ooyen-Houben, supra note 54, at 159. 
 75. BIELEMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 26. 
 76. Id. at 27. 
 77. Id.
 78. ARNT MEIN & MARIANNE VAN OOYEN-HOUBEN, BESTUURLIJKE RAPPORTAGE 
COFFEESHOP CHECKPOINT [ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT COFFEE SHOP CHECKPOINT] 10
(2011).
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The pivotal role of local authorities in the coffee shop policy causes 
local variation in the availability of cannabis through coffee shops. 
Research has shown that both the local demand for cannabis and the 
political composition of the local council influence the decision to allow 
coffee shops.79 Only coffee shops that fit in the local policy and that 
adhere to the national and local criteria will be tolerated by the police, 
Public Prosecutor, and mayor. The tolerance, thus, is bound to strict 
conditions. This is an active and systematic way of tolerance: authorities 
and Public Prosecutor decide officially and explicitly to not enforce the 
law under certain conditions.80 MacCoun classifies the regime as “quasi-
legalization”81 and Boekhout van Solinge concluded in 2004 that “[t]his 
type of regulatory prohibition . . . represents the farthest any country has 
been able to go within the current structures of global drug 
prohibition.”82
III. TENSIONS INHERENT TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Ever since its existence, the coffee shop system has been struggling 
with tensions and frictions on national and international level. These 
tensions seem inherent to the system and could not be solved, although 
the system is about 40 years old now.83 The Dutch cannabis policy—and 
thus the coffee shop system—has to fit in international treaties. The 
national policy, in its turn, functions as a framework for the local policy. 
Within this national framework, there is a lot of room for local 
authorities to tailor the national policy to their specific local situation. 
Fijnaut and De Ruyver define the discussion about cannabis policy as a 
“glocal” discussion, because the policy is shaped on international, 
 79. Marije Wouters et al., Local Politics and Retail Cannabis Markets: The Case 
of the Dutch Coffee Shops, 21 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 315, 318 (2010). 
 80. LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 2004-2005, supra note 40, at 14; 
BOEKHOUT VAN SOLINGE, supra note 30, at 131; Boekhout van Solinge, Het Nederlands 
drugsbeleid en de wet van de remmende voorsprong [The Dutch Drug Policy and the 
Law of the Inhibiting Lead], 40 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 2580, 2582 (2010).  
 81. Robert J. MacCoun, What Can We Learn from the Dutch Cannabis 
Coffeeshop System?, 106 ADDICTION 1899, 1909 (2011). 
 82. BOEKHOUT VAN SOLINGE, supra note 30, at 23. 
 83. Jansen, supra note 8, at 98; KORF, supra note 8, at 70; MARCO MEESTERS,
HET FAILLIET VAN HET GEDOGEN: OP WEG NAAR DE CANNABISWET [BANKRUPTCY OF THE 
DECEASED: ON THE WAY TO THE CANNABIS LAW] 7 (2015).
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national, and local level.84 I will illustrate the tensions on the different 
levels.
Ͳ First, there are frictions between the international UN treaties, 
which aim at banning cannabis except for medical or scientific purposes. 
Is the coffee shop system permissible under international drug treaties?  
Ͳ Second, the system only regulates the sale of cannabis to 
consumers, not the cultivation for this sale. This halfway regulation is a 
paradox in the system, which causes continuous debate between parties 
on the national level and tensions between municipalities and the 
national policy makers. These tensions plod along heavily. How do the 
Netherlands cope with their half-way regulated system? 
Ͳ Third, the mayor, the local prosecutor and the chief of the police can 
shape the national policy to their local practice, which means that they 
have to agree on the local coffee shop policy. The city council has to 
agree. The prosecutor has to follow the national instructions and the 
national enforcement policy, whereas the mayor is mainly concerned 
about local public order. How do local authorities handle tensions caused 
by these different interests?  
A. Is the coffee shop system permissible under international drug 
treaties? 
In the view of the International Narcotics Control Board, the 
committee that is responsible for the control and supervision of the 
implementation of the UN Narcotic Drugs Conventions—especially the 
UN 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended by the 1972 
Protocol,85 and also the UN 1988 Illicit Traffic Convention86—the Dutch 
policy of tolerance with regard to coffee shops contravenes the 
Conventions.87 The Conventions decidedly aim at limiting the use of 
 84. CYRILLE FIJNAUT & BRICE DE RUYVER, DE DERDE WEG, EEN PLEIDOOI VOOR 
EEN EVENWICHTIG CANNABISBELEID [THE THIRD WAY, A PLEA FOR A BALANCED CANNABIS 
POLICY] 1 (2014).  
 85. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 art. 18, Mar. 25, 1961, 976 
U.N.T.S. 105, amended by 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, 1961, Mar. 24, 1972. 
 86. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, 1988, res. 3, Dec. 20, 1988 ,1582 U.N.T.S. 95. 
 87. DE KORT, supra note 8, at 257; see also infra notes 91, 93–94. 
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narcotics such as cannabis to purely medical and scientific purposes, 
“[t]he Parties shall take such legislative and administrative measures as 
may be necessary . . . (c) Subject to the provisions of this Convention, to 
limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, 
manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession 
of drugs.”88 From the Preamble of the Convention, the body of text, the 
system, and the history of deliberations of the UN Drugs Conventions, it 
is clear that “eradicating cannabis for recreational use is the object and 
purpose of these Conventions.”89
According to the Board, the coffee shop system does not fit in this 
target and also stimulates social acceptation of cannabis abuse and 
demotivates other states in their combat against cannabis.90 The Board is 
clear in its conclusions and reiterated them in subsequent annual reports, 
for instance,
[S]ome States parties have “permitted the use of ‘safer crack kits,’ the 
existence of so-called ‘coffee shops’ and the establishment and 
operation of so-called ‘drug injection rooms.’ The Board has warned 
that such policies promote social and legal tolerance of drug abuse and 
drug trafficking and therefore contravene the international drug control 
treaties.91
While the Board has taken note of this development,92 “its position 
continues to be that such ‘coffee shops’ are in violation of the provisions 
 88. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, supra note 85, at art. 4. 
 89. P.H.P.H.M.C. VAN KEMPEN & M.I. FEDOROVA, INTERNATIONAAL RECHT EN 
CANNABIS: EEN BEOORDELING OP BASIS VAN VN-DRUGSVERDRAGEN EN EU-
DRUGSREGELGEVING VAN GEMEENTELIJKE EN BUITENLANDSE OPVATTINGEN PRO 
REGULERING VAN CANNABISTEELT VOOR RECREATIEF GEBRUIK [INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
CANNABIS: AN ASSESSMENT OF MUNICIPAL AND FOREIGN VIEWS IN FAVOUR OF 
REGULATING CANNABIS CULTIVATION FOR RECREATIONAL USE BASED ON UN NARCOTIC 
DRUGS CONVENTIONS AND THE EU LEGAL INSTRUMENTS IN ANTI-DRUGS POLICY] 240
(2014).
 90. Rep. of the Int’l Narcotics Control Board for 2011, U.N. Doc. 
E/INCB/2011/1, ¶ 283 (2012). Note that the Netherlands also have a policy of tolerance 
with regard to drug injection rooms. These reflect, like the coffee shops, the national 
health oriented and risk-reducing drug policy. Id. at 38. 
 91. Id. ¶ 283. 
 92. Id. ¶ 718. The Board refers here to the amendments in 2012 in the Dutch 
coffee shop policy as contained in the Opium Act Directive for the Public Prosecutor: the 
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of the international drug control conventions.”93 “The Board notes the 
measures94 taken by the Government of the Netherlands to implement 
stricter policies towards ‘coffee shops’ and calls upon the Government to 
step up its efforts to ensure the full compliance of the Netherlands with 
the provisions of the international drug control treaties.”95
In order to achieve the stated eradication target, the UN Drugs 
Conventions provide for a prohibitive and repressive enforcement 
system, which imposes a wide spectrum of diverse criminal, 
administrative and other obligations on the parties to the Convention. 
Judicial research in the Netherlands concludes that this includes “a total 
ban on the possession of cannabis intended for personal recreational use 
[and] obligations to also seize cannabis intended for recreational use.”96
Implementation of all these obligations should result in a zero circulation 
of narcotics—including cannabis—for recreational use.97
Relevant in this respect is that the Netherlands made an official 
‘Reservation’ to article 3, paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, of the UN 1988 Illicit 
Traffic Convention stating, “[t]he Government of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands accepts the provisions of article 3, paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, 
only in so far as the obligations under these provisions are in accordance 
with Dutch criminal legislation and Dutch policy on criminal matters.”98
By doing so, it aimed at preserving the fundamental role of the national 
Private club and the Residence criterion for coffee shops were added to the national 
criteria for tolerance of coffee shops. Access to coffee shops was restricted to residents of 
the Netherlands aged 18 years or older who are members of the coffee shop. These were 
radical entry restrictions. The aim was reducing the size of coffee shops, facilitating 
control and combating drug tourism. Rep. of the Int’l Narcotics Control Board for 2012, 
U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2012/1, ¶ 757 (2013). 
 93. U.N. Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2012, supra 
note 80, ¶ 756.  
 94. Rep. of the Int’l Narcotics Control Board for 2013, U.N. Doc. 
E/INCB/2013/1, ¶ 54 (2014). ‘Measures’: meant is the introduction of the Private club 
and the Residence criterion for coffee shops in 2012. Id. ¶ 56. 
 95. Id. 
 96. VAN KEMPEN & FEDOROVA, supra note 89, at 240. 
 97. Id. The obligations pertaining to European law (“the so-called EU 
Schengenacquis, the EU 1996 Joint Action Illegal Drug Trafficking and the EU 2004 
Framework Decision Illicit Drug Trafficking”) are in line with this. Id. at 239; see De 
Kort, supra note 15.  
 98. VAN KEMPEN & FEDOROVA, supra note 89, at 71. 
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expediency principle, especially in its drug policy,99 and, as can be 
reasoned, specifically with regard to tolerance of criminal acts related to 
personal use. This reservation preserved the existing policy of tolerance 
with regard to coffee shops in the Netherlands.100
The Netherlands did get a lot of critics on their drug policy—and 
especially on their coffee shop policy—from other states with more 
restrictive policies, like Sweden and France.101 Yet, the Netherlands has 
always persisted in this policy and are unwilling to abandon it,102
although there were substantial adaptations in the direction of a more 
restrictive and less lenient policy in the course of the years.103
B. How does the Netherlands cope with their halfway-regulated 
system? 
The coffee shop system can be defined as a “regulatory system for 
adults.”104 The system, however, regulates only the sale of cannabis to 
consumers.105 The authorities never regulated the supply of cannabis to 
the coffee shops.106 This leads to a central paradox in the coffee shop 
system: coffee shops can sell cannabis at their “front door,” but they are 
not allowed to buy cannabis at their “back door.”107 Although policy 
makers in the 1970s preferred a legalization of cannabis, they realized 
 99. Id. at 71–72. 
 100. Id. at 71–73.
 101. BOEKHOUT VAN SOLINGE, supra note 30, at 200, 202–08. According to Tim 
Boekhout van Solinge, the attitude in Europe became more favorable for the Netherlands. 
Boekhout van Solinge, supra note 80, at 2580, 2587. Sweden also has a specific attitude 
toward the Netherlands with respect to Dutch drug laws. See generally Ted Goldberg, 
Will Swedish and Dutch Drug Policy Converge? The Role of Theory, 14 INT’L J. SOC.
WELFARE 44 (2005). 
 102. See, e.g., BOEKHOUT VAN SOLINGE, supra note 30, at 200; see, e.g., van Laar 
et al., supra note 11, at 109, 147; see also, e.g. Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, supra note
13, at 165, 213 (explaining the driving forces behind the Dutch drug policy). 
 103. van Laar et al., supra note 11, at 109, 147; van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, 
supra note 13, at 213. 
 104. See Robert MacCoun et al., Assessing Alternative Drug Control Regimes, 15
J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 330, 333 (1996). 
 105. Aanwijzing Opiumwet (Designation Opium Act) 1 Mar. 2015, Pre-opsporing 
§ 1 (2015). 
 106. Id.
 107. van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, supra note 13, at 181. 
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that this was not feasible within the United Nations Treaties, especially 
the Single Convention.108 They expected that the international treaties 
would be adapted on the mid-range term in order to give national states 
the freedom to follow their own regimes with regard to cannabis and 
cannabis cultivation.109 However, this never happened.  
It was also assumed that the Netherlands was too small and thus not 
interesting enough for the international drug trade.110 The conviction was 
that nobody could get rich from trafficking of cannabis in the 
Netherlands.111 Until the 1990s, the cannabis in the Netherlands came 
from abroad, mainly from Morocco.112 Policy makers did not anticipate 
the development and explosive growth of domestic cannabis cultivation 
and underestimated the lucrativeness of the commercial sale of cannabis 
to consumers that developed since the 1980s.113
The halfway regulation caused numerous political debates in the 
Netherlands, a debate which has continued over the years.114 While some 
parties in the Parliament want to include cannabis cultivation in the 
coffee shop system in order to be able to control the cannabis and to 
exclude criminals and criminal networks from the coffee shop cannabis 
chain, other parties are vigorously opposed.115 There is also a dividing 
line between a majority of municipalities and the national authorities, 
represented by the minister of Security and Justice.116
In 2005, the mayor of Maastricht, a municipality in the South of the 
Netherlands, very close to the Belgian border, called for a regulation of 
the cannabis cultivation.117 In his view, the ban on cultivation for 
 108. DE KORT, supra note 8, at 253.
 109. Id.
 110. Leuw, supra note 15, at 251. 
 111. Id.; van de Bunt, supra note 32, at 15. 
 112. See Kenza Afsahi, Are Moroccan Cannabis Growers Able to Adapt to Recent 
European Market Trend? 26 INT’L J. DRUG POLICY 327, 327–28 (2015).
 113. van de Bunt, supra note 32, at 16; Mark van der Giessen et al., Estimating the 
Production, Consumption and Export of Cannabis, the Dutch Case, 31 INT’L J. DRUG
POL’Y 104 (2016); BOEKHOUT VAN SOLINGE, supra note 30, at 138; DE KORT, supra note 
8, at 255–56.
 114. See, e.g. VAN HET LOO ET AL., supra note 54, at 20; see, e.g., BOEKHOUT VAN 
SOLINGE, supra note 30, at 138; see, e.g., DE KORT, supra note 8, at 257.
 115. See, e.g., FIJNAUT & DE RUYVER, supra note 84, at 112, 116.
 116. See, e.g., VAN HET LOO ET AL., supra note 54, at 20. 
 117. LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT, Kamervragen (Aanhangsel) 2004-2005, 
File No 1290, VRAGEN VAN HET LID VAN DER HAM (D66) AAN DE MINISTER VAN JUSTITIE 
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recreational use is enhancing crime and the many illegal cultivation sites 
cause nuisance and danger for neighbors.118 He argued that regulation—
in combination with other measures—would solve these problems and 
warned that the Netherlands should not take this step alone: other 
European countries should also adhere to such a policy.119 The minister 
of Security and Justice reacted aversely, stating “as far as the initiative of 
the mayor of Maastricht aims at regulation or legalization of the 
cultivation of cannabis, this is against the Dutch law.”120 In addition, the 
minister points out that regulation or legalization will not solve the 
problems around the existing illegal cultivation, that it would require 
supervision of the tolerated cultivation and that the proposals do not fit in 
the international treaties and thus “there is no reason to review the 
policy.”121
The mayor of Maastricht was not the only one who pleaded for a 
regulation or legalization.122 And the minister of Security and Justice in 
2005 was not the only one who rejected it.123 There were already intense 
debates on the issue in the beginning of the 1990s.124 The problem of 
illegal cultivation sites was extensively addressed in a policy document 
in 2000 (in the document titled “The road to the back door”)125 and again 
EN DE STAATSSECRETARIS VAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID, WELZIJN EN SPORT OVER DE 
UITSPRAKEN VAN DE BURGEMEESTER VAN MAASTRICHT OVER SOFTDRUGS IN DE REGIO 
MAASTRICHT [QUESTIONS OF THE MEMBER VAN DER HAM (D66) TO THE MINISTER OF 
JUSTICE AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF HEALTH, WELFARE AND SPORTS ABOUT
PRONUNCIATIONS OF THE MAYOR OF MAASTRICHT ABOUT SOFT DRUGS IN THE REGION OF 
MAASTRICHT], 2735–36 (April 6, 2005).  
 118. Id.
 119. Id.
 120. Id. at 134, 2735. 
 121. LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 2004-2005 File No 24077 156, 
DRUGBELEID, BRIEF MINISTER MET TOEGEZEGDE REACTIE OP RECENTE UITLATINGEN 
BURGEMEESTER LEERS VAN MAASTRICHT IN TOESPRAAK EUROPEES PARLEMENT VAN 21
APRIL 2005 OVER DRUGSPROBLEMATIEK IN DE GRENSSTREEK [DRUG POLICY, LETTER OF 
MINISTER WITH PROMISED REACTION ON RECENT PRONUNCIATIONS OF MAYOR LEERS OF 
MAASTRICHT IN SPEECH TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT OF APRIL 21 2005 ABOUT DRUG 
PROBLEMS IN THE BORDER REGION], 3 (April 26, 2005). 
 122. van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, supra note 13, at 181; see generally 
MEESTERS, supra note 83.
 123. van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, supra note 13, at 181. 
 124. FIJNAUT & DE RUYVER, supra note 84, at 109–18.
 125. LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 1999-2000, File No 24077 75, 
DRUGBELEID, BRIEF MINISTER BIJ DE NOTITIE ‘HET PAD NAAR DE ACHTERDEUR’ OVER DE 
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in 2004 (in the “Cannabis Letter”).126 Time and again the cabinet and the 
minister of Security and Justice state that international obligations 
forbade any kind of regulation of cannabis cultivation and that they will 
not take any step in the direction of regulation or legalization.127
Municipalities did not give up, though. The mayor of Maastricht got 
company from several other mayors, who wanted to experiment with 
regulation in order to contain the “back door” problem and combat the 
danger and the nuisance of the many illegal cannabis cultivation sites in 
their municipalities.128 The mayors prefer a clear system, which makes a 
distinction between illegal cultivation—that has to be combatted—and 
cultivation as part of the tolerance system—which can be tolerated.  
Three judicial studies were conducted in order to get clarity about the 
question whether authorities are permitted under international law to 
regulate the cultivation and the trade in cannabis for recreational use. In 
AANVOER VAN SOFTDRUGS NAAR DE COFFEESHOPS [DRUG POLICY, LETTER OF THE MINISTER 
ACCOMPANYING THE NOTE ‘THE PATH TO THE BACK DOOR’ ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF SOFT 
DRUGS TO THE COFFEE SHOPS] (April 7, 2000); MEESTERS, supra note 83, at 5.  
 126. LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 2003-2004, File No 24077 125, 
DRUGSBELEID, BRIEF MINISTERS OVER HET CANNABISBELEID [DRUG POLICY, LETTER OF THE 
MINISTERS ABOUT THE CANNABIS POLICY], 5–8 (April 23, 2004).  
 127. LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 2008-2009, File No 24077 232,
DRUGSBELEID, BRIEF MINISTERS OVER EEN AANTAL AAN DE DRUGSPROBLEMATIEK IN DE 
GRENSSTREEK GERELATEERDE ZAKEN [DRUG POLICY, LETTER OF MINISTERS ABOUT A 
NUMBER ITEMS RELATED TO THE DRUG PROBLEM IN THE BORDER REGION], 2–3 (May 12, 
2009); LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 2013-2014, File No 24077 314, DRUGBELEID,
BRIEF REGERING, TOEZEGGINGEN COFFEESHOPBELEID [DRUG POLICY, LETTER OF THE 
GOVERNMENT, PROMISES WITH REGARD TO COFFEE SHOP POLICY], 3–9 (Dec.18 2013); 
LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 2013-2014, File No 24077 316, DRUGBELEID,
TOEZEGGINGEN ALGEMEEN OVERLEG COFFEESHOPBELEID EN AANBIEDING RAPPORT 
‘INTERNATIONAAL RECHT EN CANNABIS’ [DRUG POLICY, PROMISES GENERAL 
DELIBERATIONS ABOUT THE COFFEE SHOP POLICY AND PRESENTATION OF THE REPORT 
‘INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CANNABIS], 4–5 (March 21, 2014); LOWER HOUSE OF THE 
PARLIAMENT 2015-2016, File No 24077 346, DRUGBELEID, BRIEF REGERING, UITVOERING 
VAN DE MOTIE VAN HET LID OSKAM OVER GEREGULEERDE WIETTEELT [DRUG POLICY,
LETTER OF THE GOVERNMENT, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOTION OF THE MEMBER OSKAM
ABOUT REGULATED CANNABIS CULTIVATION] 1 (May 27, 2015). 
 128. LIMBURGIAN MUNICIPALITIES, LIMBURG TREKT ZIJN GRENS, EEN 
PROVINCIEBREED INITIATIEF VOOR HET HUIDIGE SOFTDRUGSBELEID (LIMBURG DRAWS ITS 
LINES, A PROVINCE-WIDE ALTERNATIVE FOR THE PRESENT SOFT DRUGS POLICY (2009); see 
also MAYORS OF HEERLEN, UTRECHT AND EINDHOVEN, MANIFEST JOINT REGULATION 
(2014). In 2015, this Manifesto was signed by a majority – 59 of 103 – of municipalities 
with coffee shops. 
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2005, a study commissioned by the minister of Security and Justice 
concluded that there are no judicial options for legalization or regulation 
of cannabis cultivation under the international drug treaties.129 A 
replication study carried out in 2014 by the Radboud University 
Nijmegen supported this conclusion.130A third judicial study, 
commissioned by the municipalities of Utrecht, Heerlen and Eindhoven, 
looked at the question from a different perspective, not only from the 
internal perspective of the drug treaties, but this time from the external 
perspective of international human rights conventions.131 From this 
external perspective there is a possibility to regulate, even by 
legalization, the cultivation of and trade in cannabis for the recreational 
user market.132 The possibility only exists if at least the following 
conditions are met: 
ͲThe regulation should protect interests that are relevant from the 
perspective of positive human rights obligations. 
ͲThe claim of a more effective human rights protection must be 
substantiated. 
ͲThere has to be national democratic support and decision-making. 
ͲOther states should not be confronted with negative consequences; 
therefore, the state should create a closed national system. 
 129. T.C.M. ASSER INSTITUTE, EXPERIMENTEREN MET HET GEDOGEN VAN DE TEELT 
VAN CANNABIS TEN BEHOEVE VAN DE BEVOORRADING VAN COFFEESHOPS, INTERNATIONAAL 
RECHTELIJKE EN EUROPEES RECHTELIJKE ASPECTEN [EXPERIMENTS WITH THE TOLERANCE 
OF THE CULTIVATION OF CANNABIS ON BEHALF OF THE SUPPLY OF COFFEE SHOPS, ASPECTS 
OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW] 25 (2005).
 130. VAN KEMPEN & FEDOROVA, supra note 89, at 260. 
 131. See generally P.H.P.H.M.C. VAN KEMPEN & M.I. FEDOROVA,
INTERNATIONAAL RECHT EN CANNABIS: REGULERING VAN CANNABISTEELT EN – HANDEL 
VOOR RECREATIEF GEBRUIK: POSITIEVE MENSENRECHTVERPLICHTINGEN VERSUS VN-
DRUGSVERDRAGEN [INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CANNABIS: REGULATION OF CANNABIS 
CULTIVATION AND TRADE FOR RECREATIONAL USE: POSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS VERSUS UN DRUG TREATIES] (2016). 
 132. Id. at 335, 341. 
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ͲThe state should create an adequate policy to ensure discouragement, 
limitation and increased public awareness of the risks associated with 
recreational use of cannabis.133
The minister of Security and Justice concluded that is it insecure 
whether or not these conditions are met in the Netherlands and that no 
change in the policy is indicated.134
The paradox of the half-regulated coffee shop system still exists in 
2017. The differences between municipalities who want regulation and 
the national policy makers still continue and sometimes it seems as if the 
debate will never end.135
C. How do local authorities handle tensions caused by different 
interests? 
The mayor, the Chief of the police and the local Prosecutor have to 
agree on a local policy and the mayor has to render account to the city 
council.136 The mayor’s first worry is the public order and controlling the 
public nuisance, whereas the Public Prosecutor wants to fight crime and 
drive back the supply of drugs.137 That can result in tensions, as 
illustrated by the case of coffee shop ‘Checkpoint,’ one of the biggest 
coffee shops of the Netherlands, in a small city near the Belgian border, 
Terneuzen:
Terneuzen decided to introduce a policy of tolerance in the 1990s. Two 
coffee shops were established: ‘Miami’ and ‘Checkpoint.’ The policy 
was fruitful in the sense that illegal drug trade and drug-related 
nuisance were reduced substantially. With the passage of time, 
 133. Id. at 332-34, 338–41. 
 134. LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT, KAMERVRAGEN (AANHANGSEL) 2015-
2016 File No 2838, ANTWOORD OP DE VRAGEN VAN DE LEDEN KOOIMAN EN BERGKAMP 
OVER LEGALE WIETTEELT ALS POSITIEVE MENSENRECHTENVERPLICHTING [ANSWER TO THE 
QUESTIONS OF THE MEMBERS KOOIMAN AND BERGKAMP ABOUT LEGAL CANNABIS 
CULTIVATION AS A POSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATION] 2, 4 (June 15, 2016). 
 135. MEESTERS, supra note 83, at 5. 
 136. van Ooyen-Houben, supra note 54, at 34. 
 137. VAN HET LOO ET AL., supra note 54, at 78–79; Arnt Mein & Marianne van 
Ooyen-Houben, The Rise and Fall of Coffee Shop Checkpoint in Terneuzen, 1 CIROC
(CENTRE FOR INFORMATION AND RESEARCH ON ORGANIZED CRIME) NEWSLETTER 4, 4–5 
(2013).
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however, the situation around Checkpoint became more and more 
difficult, especially when the municipality relocated it to a prominent 
and easily accessible new location that proved to be good for a robust 
further growth. The shop developed into a large and successful 
professional enterprise. It attracted thousands of visitors daily, of whom 
the majority came from Belgium and France. The municipality saw 
Checkpoint as a ‘model coffee shop’ and the mayor showed it regularly 
to his visitors from abroad. The stream of visitors, however, resulted in 
serious nuisances for the local population. The municipality tried 
different ways to contain the problem. It installed road signs to the 
coffee shop, created parking facilities and set up additional supervision. 
Finally, it felt forced to relocate the coffee shop outside the 
municipality, in borderland. While the mayor wanted to push back the 
nuisance, the local Prosecutor regarded the coffee shop as a criminal 
organization and insisted on pushing back the supply. The prosecutor 
opposed the relocation outside the municipality. The local authorities 
did not come to an agreement on the collective approach to deal with 
the coffee shop 138
The end of the story was that the police and the prosecutor raided the 
coffee shop in June 2007; 96 kilos of cannabis were confiscated.139
During a later search in May 2008, the police confiscated another batch 
of more than 130 kilos.140 The violations of the conditions for tolerance 
gave cause to the mayor of Terneuzen to close the coffee shop and 
withdraw the license; at the same time, the coffee shop owner and his 
staff were prosecuted for breaching the Opium Act and taking part in a 
criminal organization.141 This last charge was based on the fact that the 
coffee shop owner used different secret stashes outside the coffee shop, 
e.g. at his employees’ homes, and he employed home-workers who 
prepared joints for his customers.142
The regional court of first instance came to a conviction, but the 
sentence was moderated because of the close involvement of local 
 138. Mein & van Ooyen-Houben, supra note 137, at 64–65. 
 139. MEIN & OOYEN-HOUBEN, supra note 78, at 7, 53–55.  
 140. Id.
 141. Id. at 53–54. 
 142. Id. at 34–35. 
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authorities in the growth of the coffee shop.143 In appeal, the court of 
appeal declared the prosecutor inadmissible, in view of the role of the 
local authorities, who never gave any sign that the coffee shop was 
violating rules.144 The Supreme Court annihilated this judgment and sent 
the case back to an adjacent court of appeal,145 which declared the 
inadmissibility of the prosecutor in the prosecution because of selling 
cannabis and because of membership of a criminal organization, and 
judged the coffee shop owner and staff as guilty in the case of possessing 
large amounts of cannabis and handling cannabis, but did not impose a 
sentence.146 The case went back to the Supreme Court and in April 2016, 
the case was sent back again to an adjacent court of appeal.147
This case illustrates the local controversy that can arise around a 
coffee shop.148 The mayor, in his efforts to reduce public nuisance, 
adhered to the local coffee shop policy and wanted to maintain the coffee 
shop, while the prosecutor, in his efforts to reduce crime and export of 
cannabis, wanted to close the coffee shop149
Another example of problems plodding along for a long time could be 
observed in the city of Venlo, which is situated near the German 
border.150 Venlo is a draw for German visitors and in the wake of the 
shopping crowds came, since the early 1990s, a lot of ‘drug tourists’ – 
 143. See generally Rb. Middelburg 25 maart 2010, rechtspraak.nl 2010, 
ECLI:NL:RBMID:2010:BL8815 m.nt. (State of the Netherlands, Public Prosecutor 
Rammeloo/owner of coffee shop Checkpoint, Willemsen) (Neth.). 
 144. See generally Hof’s-Gravenhage 02 februari 2012, rechtspraak.nl 2012, 
ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2012:BV2572 m.nt (State of the Netherlands, Public 
Prosecutor/owner of coffee shop Checkpoint Willemsen) (Neth.). 
 145. See generally HR 2 juli 2013, rechtspraak.nl 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:7 m.nt 
(Solicitor-general in appeal in cassation against judgment of Hof’s-Gravenhage) (Neth.). 
 146. See generally Hof’s-Amsterdam 16 juli 2014, rechtspraak.nl, 2014 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:2840 m.nt (State of the Netherlands, public prosecutor/owner of 
coffee shop Checkpoint, Willemsen) (Neth.). 
 147. See generally HR 26 april 2016, rechtspraak.nl 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:742 
m.nt (Solicitor-general in appeal in cassation against judgement of Hof Amsterdam) 
(Neth).
 148. MEIN & MARIANNE VAN OOYEN-HOUBEN, supra note 78, at 62. 
 149. Id. at 50. 
 150. See generally J. SNIPPE ET AL., HEKTOR 2010 EN 2011: EVALUATIE AANPAK 
DRUGSOVERLAST IN VENLO [DRUG NUISANCE IN VENLO] (2012); J. SNIPPE ET AL., HEKTOR 
EN 2005: EVALUATIE AANPAK DRUGSOVERLAST IN VENLO [DRUG NUISANCE IN VENLO] 9
(2006).
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people from Germany who came to buy soft drugs in Venlo.151 In 1991, 
Venlo counted 39 coffee shops.152 This number was reduced by the local 
authorities to five in 1996.153 By the end of the 1990s, Venlo had severe 
problems with nuisance from hard drug premises, street dealers, drugs 
runners and a considerable stream of coffee shop customers.154 The 
nuisance concentrated in the city center.155 In 2001, the local authorities 
started a project, “Hektor,” which contained plans to enforce rules and 
public order, close drug premises, gentrification of the city center, and a 
coffee shop policy which aimed at the opening of two additional coffee 
shops in a location outside the city, in the direction of the border.156 This 
coffee shop policy was not implemented, but instead two existing coffee 
shops were relocated to the location near the German border in 2004.157
This took a long political debate in Venlo.158 About half of the stream of 
foreign visitors to coffee shops went to the new location in 2005.159 The 
city center improved, nuisance was reduced, and safety was increased.160
The nuisance increased in the neighborhood of the new location, but the 
police enforced the nuisance laws and the coffee shops themselves took 
action against nuisance, so it stayed manageable.161 There was some 
displacement of street dealing and drugs running, but this was limited.162
In general, this policy turned out in a positive way.163
A third example of local (regional) controversies is Maastricht, also 
located near the Belgian border. Here, also, there was a problem of drug 
 151. Id. at 1. 
 152. B. BIELEMAN ET AL., COFFEESHOPS NAAR DE PERIFERIE: EVALUATIE
VERPLAATSING TWEE COFFEESHOPS IN VENLO [COFFEESHOPS TO THE PERIPHERY:
EVALUATION MOVE TWO COFFEESHOPS IN VENLO] 1 (2006).
 153. SNIPPE ET AL. (2012), supra note 150, at 1. 
 154. Id.
 155. Id.
 156. SNIPPE ET AL. (2012), supra note 150, at 53. 
 157. SNIPPE ET AL. (2006), supra note 150, at 21–22; BIELEMAN ET AL., supra note 
152, at 2. 
 158. See BIELEMAN ET AL., supra note 152, at 2. 
 159. SNIPPE ET AL. (2012), supra note 150, at 38. 
 160. Id. at 53. 
 161. See BIELEMAN ET AL., supra note 152, at 8–9. 
 162. Id. at 9. 
 163. SNIPPE ET AL. (2012), supra note 150, at 53. 
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tourism causing public nuisance, dealing, and drug running.164 Maastricht 
tried to cope with the problem by introducing—first by way of a pilot 
(because the municipality wanted to evoke a judicial procedure)—a 
residence criterion in its General Local Decree in 2005: non-residents of 
the Netherlands were no longer allowed to enter a coffee shop or buy 
cannabis there.165 A coffee shop owner whose shop was closed by the 
mayor after a violation of the criterion contested this. He was successful 
because the Unit of administrative law of the Council of State concluded 
that the criterion was in line with European law and with the 
Constitution, given that there are objective justifications, but not with the 
Opium Act.166  The Cabinet decided, in a reaction, to add a residence 
criterion in the already existing tolerance criteria in the Directive Opium 
Act for the Prosecutor.167 Plans of the city of Maastricht to relocate 
coffee shops to the periphery of the city, concentrating them in a ‘coffee 
corner,’ were contested by neighboring villages who were afraid of 
nuisance.168 Although the Council of State supported the relocation plans 
of Maastricht, they were never effectuated because they were overruled 
by the introduction of new national criteria.169
The frictions and tensions inherent to the coffee shop system are 
undeniable.170 But what about the benefits of the system? Does it reach 
its goals? Why has the system survived (until now)?  
 164. R. NIJKAMP ET AL., NULMETING OVERLAST EN BEZOEK COFFEESHOPS 
MAASTRICHT [BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF NUISANCE AND COFFEE SHOP VISITS IN 
MAASTRICHT] 1 (2008). 
 165. M.M.J. van Ooyen-Houben, Inleiding [Introduction], in HET BESLOTEN 
CLUB- EN HET INGEZETENENCRITERIUM VOOR COFFEESHOPS [THE PRIVATE CLUB AND THE 
RESIDENCE CRITERION FOR COFFEE SHOPS) 16–17 (M.M.J. van Ooyen-Houben et al. eds., 
2013] (with a report summary in English). 
 166. See generally id.
 167. van Ooyen-Houben, supra note 165, at 15–17.
 168. ABRvS 14 augustus 2013, rechtspraak.nl 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:696 
m.nt (Exploitatiemaatschappij Pegasus B.B., local authorities of Blegny Belgium, Bruto 
Real Estate B.V., ACI Supplies, Foundation Grueles, local authorities of Eijsden-
Margraten, Fun Valley, Banketbakkerij Nora and others/city council of Maastricht) 
(Neth.) [hereinafter Operating Company/City Council of Maastricht]; van Ooyen-Houben 
& van der Giessen, supra note 38, at 38. 
 169. Operating Company/City Council of Maastricht.
 170. See, e.g., van Ooyen-Houben & Mein, supra note 54, at 55, 63–80. 
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IV. THE BENEFITS OF THE SYSTEM
If the idea behind the coffee shop system is right, then the coffee shop 
system should contribute to a separation of the cannabis retail market and 
the hard drug retail markets in the Netherlands. We should also observe 
that cannabis users in the Netherlands move less often to hard drugs use 
than in a system without coffee shops. A third hypothesis is that cannabis 
users in the Netherlands are well integrated in society and do not get in 
contact with the criminal justice system.  
These hypotheses are supported by evidence.171 Coffee shops are not 
only the most important retail channel for cannabis in the Netherlands, 
but also contribute to a separation of markets: they keep cannabis users 
for al large part away from illegal dealers and thus reduce the risk that 
they get in contact with hard drugs. Cannabis users are, in general, well 
integrated in society. In this respect, the system was good for the 
consumers.
Some facts and figures:  
Ͳ In April 2015, there were 582 coffee shops, spread all over the 
country.172 At the same time, there existed an illegal cannabis retail 
market.173 Van der Giessen, Moolenaar and Van Ooyen estimate that 55-
70% of the adult cannabis users in the Netherlands buys its cannabis in a 
coffee shop.174 Other estimates resulted in percentages of 56-67% market 
 171. van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, supra note 13, at 187–95. 
 172. BIELEMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 9. 
 173. DIRK J. KORF ET AL., CANNABIS ZONDER COFFEESHOP, NIET-GEDOOGDE 
VERKOOP VAN CANNABIS IN TIEN NEDERLANDSE GEMEENTEN [CANNABIS WITHOUT COFFEE 
SHOPS, NOT-TOLERATED SALE OF CANNABIS IN TEN DUTCH MUNICIPALITIES] 139 (2005) 
[hereinafter CANNABIS WITHOUT COFFEE SHOPS] (with a report summary in English); see 
generally D.J. Korf et al., De illegale gebruikersmarkt [The Illegal Retail Market], in
COFFEESHOPS, TOERISTEN EN LOKALE MARKT, EVALUATIE VAN HET BESLOTEN CLUB- EN HET 
INGEZETENENCRITERIUM VOOR COFFEESHOPS [COFFEE SHOPS, TOURISTS AND LOCAL 
MARKETS, EVALUATION OF THE PRIVATE CLUB AND THE RESIDENCE CRITERION] 133-186 
(M. van Ooyen-Houben, et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter Illegal Retail Market] (with a 
report summary in English); R. MENNES ET AL., MONITOR ONTWIKKELINGEN 
COFFEESHOPBELEID, METING 2015 [MONITOR OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COFFEE SHOP 
POLICY, ASSESSMENT 2015] 47–58 (2016) (with a report summary in English). 
 174. M. VAN DER GIESSEN ET AL., DE EXPORT VAN IN NEDERLAND GETEELDE 
CANNABIS [THE EXPORT OF CANNABIS CULTIVATED IN THE NETHERLANDS] 118–19 (2014) 
(with a report summary in English). 
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share of coffee shops among adult cannabis users.175 In municipalities 
with coffee shops, the market share is even higher: 87-90% of adult 
actual users in a street survey bought their cannabis in a coffee shop in 
2013.176 17-25% also bought it outside the coffee shop in 2013,177 like 
with a mobile phone dealer or a home dealer, and 8-13% cultivated their 
own cannabis.178
Ͳ The dealers outside the coffee shop more often offer also hard drugs 
to their customers: home dealers or mobile phone dealers for instance 
also sell hard drugs in 33%-51% of the cases; this percentage is even 
higher among street dealers: 67%.179 Coffee shop owners and operators, 
on the other hand, are keen of keeping hard drugs out of their business,180
because they think that this is the core reason for their existence and 
because of the severe sanctions that apply on infractions.181 Controls of 
coffee shops focus on the presence of hard drugs (and youngsters). When 
hard drugs are detected the mayor will, as a rule in most places, directly 
close the coffee shop.182
Ͳ There is also evidence that coffee shops prevent users from going to 
the illegal market. Research shows that the higher the coffee shop density 
is in a municipality, the lower the local market share of illegal dealers.183
Other evidence comes from a study into the consequences of entry 
restrictions for coffee shops in three provinces of the Netherlands in 
2012. A substantial part of the customers of the coffee shops decided to 
turn to the illegal market then.184 The number of visits to coffee shops 
 175. van Laar et al., supra note 11, at 120–21. 
 176. Illegal Retail Market, supra note 173, at 148. 
 177. Id. at 141. 
 178. Id. at 138. 
 179. CANNABIS WITHOUT COFFEE SHOPS, supra note 173, at 80–81. 
 180. BIELEMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 39. 
 181. See D. DE BRUIN ET AL., COFFEESHOPS IN NEDERLAND 2007: NALEVING EN 
HANDHAVING VAN COFFEESHOPREGELS [COFFEE SHOPS IN THE NETHERLANDS 2007:
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF COFFEE SHOP REGULATIONS] 51-55 (2008) (with a 
report summary in English). 
 182. BIELEMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 30. 
 183. CANNABIS WITHOUT COFFEE SHOPS, supra note 173, at 89, 93.
 184. Marianne M.J. van Ooyen-Houben et al., Tightening the Dutch Coffee Shop 
Policy: Evaluation of the Private Club and the Residence Criterion, 31 INT’L J. DRUG
POL’Y 113, 117 (2016). 
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decreased by 76%.185 When the restrictions were loosened again in 2013, 
there was a movement back towards the coffee shops, indicating that 
coffee shops took over part of the illegal retail market again, a market 
that included mobile phone dealers, street dealers, and home dealers.’186
International comparisons support the evidence that coffee shops 
indeed contribute to the separation of cannabis- and hard drug consumer 
markets. The retail markets of cannabis and those of hard drugs like 
heroin, crack, cocaine or amphetamine are more separated in the 
Netherlands than in other European countries or the US.187 The 
correlation between the use of cannabis and the use of cocaine and 
amphetamines is weaker in the Netherlands and the step from cannabis 
use towards use of hard drugs is less probable here.188 Cannabis users in 
the Netherlands use relatively few hard drugs like cocaine, amphetamine, 
heroin, and crack, and there are few hard drug addicts among the 
cannabis users compared to other countries.189 The use of ecstasy, 
though, is higher and cannabis users with a regular or frequent pattern of 
use have more experience with hard drugs than in the general 
population.190 The use of hard drugs is relatively low in the Netherlands, 
with ecstasy as an exception.191
Finally, the evidence shows that the majority of the customers of 
coffee shops are students or people who have a job.192 A recent thesis 
 185. Id. at 116. 
 186. Id. at 117; MARIANNE VAN OOYEN-HOUBEN ET AL., COFFEESHOPS, TOERISTEN 
EN LOKALE MARKT, EVALUATIE VAN HET BESLOTEN CLUB- EN HET INGEZETENENCRITERIUM 
VOOR COFFEESHOPS [COFFEE SHOPS, TOURISTS AND LOCAL MARKETS, EVALUATION OF THE 
PRIVATE CLUB AND THE RESIDENCE CRITERION] 13 (M. van Ooyen-Houben, et al. eds., 
2014).
 187. MacCoun, supra note 81, at 1902; see also van Laar et al., supra note 11, at 
128–34, 148. 
 188. MacCoun, supra note 81, at 1902. 
 189. van Laar et al., supra note 11, at 129–131 
 190. Id.
 191. Id. at 128–34. 
 192. BRICE DE RUYVER & TIM SURMONT, GRENSOVERSCHRIJDEND DRUGSTOERISME,
NIEUWE UITDAGINGEN VOOR DE EUREGIO’S [CROSS-BORDER DRUG TOURISM, NEW
CHALLENGES VOR THE EUREGIONS] 70 (2007); PEGGY M. VAN DER POL, THE DYNAMICS OF 
CANNABIS USE AND DEPENDENCE 32 (2014); B. BIELEMAN & H. NAAYER, ONDERZOEK 
COFFEESHOPS TERNEUZEN [A STUDY OF THE COFFEE SHOPS IN TERNEUZEN] 11 (2007); 
GEMEENTE NIJMEGEN [MUNICIPALITY OF NIJMEGEN], HET COFFEESHOPBEZOEK IN 
NJMEGEN: EEN INVENTARISEREND ONDERZOEK NAAR DE OMVANG EN KENMERKEN VAN HET 
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shows that young adult frequent cannabis users are generally rather 
“normal” people, generally living a conventional life, including social 
and romantic activities, jobs, education, sports, and incidental minor 
delinquency (not related to cannabis).193 Cannabis users in the 
Netherlands are (in principle) not prosecuted for possession of cannabis 
for personal use (no more than five grams), which is what they can buy 
in a coffee shop.194 They will not be sentenced or imprisoned or end up 
with a criminal record, like in other countries.195 The fact that the 
majority of the coffee shop customers in the Netherlands are students or 
employed could be interpreted as an indication that they are not 
marginalized and, in general, function normally in society.196
The coffee shop system thus contributes to a separation of markets 
and counteracts the stepping-stone idea that cannabis use will lead to 
hard drug use. Cannabis users and coffee shop customers are, usually, 
not marginalized. There are, however, some relevant notes to make. 
Firstly, the separation of markets is not 100%, which means that there 
exists an illegal market outside the coffee shops.197 This market is not 
unattractive, because cannabis dealers on the illegal market offer 
cannabis of good quality for a good price (at least in Maastricht).198
Secondly, practical and scientific evidence of many years has shown that 
BEZOEK AAN DE NIJMEEGSE COFFEESHOPS [THE COFFEESHOP VISIT IN NIJMEGEN: AN
INVENTORY OF THE MAGNITUDE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VISIT TO THE NIJMEEG 
COFFEESHOPS] 20 (2008).
 193. NIENKE LIEBREGTS, CANNABIS CHANGES: UNDERSTANDING DYNAMICS OF USE
AND DEPENDENCE 37, 58–61, 83, 110, 114, 117–18 (2015). 
 194. Aanwijzing Opiumwet (Directive Opium Act) 3 Jan. 2015, § 3.4 (2015).  
 195. ROBIN ROOM ET AL., THE BECKLEY FOUNDATION’S GLOBAL CANNABIS
COMMISSION REPORT 12–14 (2009).
 196. DE RUYVER & SURMONT, supra note 192, at 70; VAN DER POL, supra note 
192, at 32; BIELEMAN & NAAYER supra note 192, at 11; GEMEENTE NIJMEGEN, supra
note 192, at 20. 
 197. VAN DER GIESSEN ET AL., supra note 174, at 118–19; van Ooyen-Houben & 
Kleemans, supra note 13, at 187. 
 198. E.J. VAN DER TORRE ET AL., SOFTDRUGSBELEID IN MAASTRICHT: DE TWEEDE 
TUSSENBALANS [SOFT DRUGS POLICY IN MAASTRICHT: THE SECOND MIDWAY ASSESSMENT 
OF RESULTS] 9 (2015), 
http://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/54486452/softdrugsbeleid-in-maastricht-de-
tweede-tussenbalans/1. 
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cannabis is not as harmless as was thought for a long time.199 Although it 
is less harmful (for users and for others) than alcohol, heroin, crack, 
cocaine or tobacco,200 we know now that cannabis use can end up in an 
addiction201 and in adverse physical and mental health effects.202
Especially early onset and long-term (almost) daily use, which occurs 
among 28.8% of the current users in the Netherlands,203 is a predictor for 
addiction and other negative effects.204 Van der Pol, for instance, 
observed first symptoms of cannabis dependence among 37% of a group 
of frequent users among the coffee shop customers within a period of 
three years.205 There are, however, also other factors that contribute to the 
development of a cannabis addiction.206 Figures from addiction care 
services show that the number of clients with a primary cannabis 
problem was almost twice as large in 2011 as in 2006 (and stable since 
then).207 Cannabis addiction often correlates with psychological 
problems208 and regular cannabis users seem to have higher risks of 
psychotic symptoms and disorders, or physical and psychosocial adverse 
effects.209
 199. W. van den Brink, Hoe schadelijk zijn softdrugs? [How Dangerous are Soft 
Drugs], 32 JUSTITIËLE VERKENNINGEN 72, 74–75 (2006); VAN DER POL, supra note 192, at 
11; see generally Wayne Hall & Louisa Degenhardt, The Adverse Health Effects of 
Chronic Cannabis Use, 6 DRUG TEST. ANALYSIS (2013); VAN LAAR & VAN OOYEN-
HOUBEN, supra note 69, at 104–06; Michael A.P. Bloomfield et al., The Effects of ǻ9-
Tetrahydrocannabinol on the Dopamine System, 539 NATURE 396 (2016).
 200. Jan van Amsterdam et al., European Rating of Drug Harms, 29 J.
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 655, 658-59 (2015). 
 201. van den Brink, supra note 199, at 74-75; VAN DER POL, supra note 192, at 11, 
67, 72; see generally Hall & Degenhardt, supra note 199; VAN LAAR & VAN OOYEN-
HOUBEN, supra note 69, at 104-06. 
 202. van den Brink, supra note 199, at 75–84; see Hall & Degenhardt, supra note 
199, at 39–43; Bloomfield et al., supra note 199, at 396. 
 203. VAN LAAR & VAN OOYEN-HOUBEN, supra note 69, at 93–94. 
 204. See Bloomfield et al., supra note 199, at 372–73; van den Brink, supra note
199, at 83–84; see Hall & Degenhardt, supra note 199, at 39–43. 
205 VAN DER POL, supra note 192, at 72–77. 
206 Id.; LIEBREGTS, supra note 193, at 199–206. 
207 MARGRIET VAN LAAR ET AL., NATIONALE DRUG MONITOR: JAARBERICHT 2016, 111–12 
(2016) (with a report summary in English). 
208 VAN DER POL, supra note 192, at 51–59. 
209 Hall & Degenhardt, supra note 199, at 41–43; van den Brink, supra note 199, at 75–
77, 83–85. 
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These notes lead us to questions about adverse developments 
correlated tot the coffee shops. Did the coffee shops contribute to an 
increase in use or addiction? Were there other adverse effects? The 
evidence teaches us that the potential dangers of the system with regard 
to cannabis use are reasonably limited.210
Ͳ Coffee shops do not necessarily lead to ‘uncontrolled,’ rampant use 
and they do not appear to encourage escalation into heavier use or 
lengthier use careers.211 In fact, the prevalence of use among youngsters 
of 12-16 years in regular secondary schools has been decreasing since 
2003.212
Ͳ There is only a modest correlation between the number of coffee 
shops and the prevalence of use.213 If there are no coffee shops, users will 
find a way to cannabis via other channels. That’s why prevalence of 
cannabis use is even higher in France, Spain or the US than in the 
Netherlands, although the other countries have no coffee shops.214 Other 
factors than the presence of coffee shops are more important for the 
prevalence of use in a country, like perceived harmfulness, availability 
and price, severity of sanctions, or characteristics of the youth culture.215
On the other hand, the prevalence of cannabis use among adolescents 
in regular secondary schools and among the general population aged 15-
64 is high compared to other countries.216 Use is also high among 
vulnerable groups of youngsters—youngsters who have problems or who 
stay in residential youth facilities.217 According to the European School  
Survey Project On Alcohol and Other Drugs (ESPAD), 42% of the 15-16 
year old students in regular schools in the Netherlands perceive cannabis 
as fairly easy or very easy to obtain, which is a relatively high percentage 
in comparison with 15-16 year olds in other EU-countries.218 A relatively 
high percentage (50%) started using cannabis at the age of 13 or 
210 van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, supra note 13, at 189–92. 
211 MacCoun, supra note 81, at 1901–02. 
212 VAN LAAR & VAN OOYEN-HOUBEN, supra note 69, at 75. 
213 MacCoun, supra note 81, at 1899, 1900–04; VAN HET LOO ET AL., supra note 54, at 35,
38, 40, 47–48.
214 VAN LAAR & VAN OOYEN-HOUBEN, supra note 69, at 108. 
215 van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, supra note 13, at 191. 
216 VAN LAAR & VAN OOYEN-HOUBEN, supra note 69, at 26. 
217 Id. at 101–02. 
218 THE ESPAD GROUP, ESPAD REPORT 2015: RESULTS FROM THE EUROPEAN SCHOOL 
SURVEY PROJECT ON ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUGS 31 (2016). 
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younger.219 Palali and Van Ours suggest that the vicinity of a coffee shop 
(within 20 kilometers) is correlated to a younger age of onset of cannabis 
use.220
From the evidence described above it can be concluded that the coffee 
shop system functions well for the mainstream cannabis users. They 
benefit from the non-marginalization and non-criminalization without 
getting into trouble with their use. Youngsters and vulnerable groups, 
however, use cannabis a lot and this is a risk. The exact causal relation 
between the “coffee shop” factor and the prevalence of use is difficult to 
determine. The relations seem complicated.221
V. ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS IN NUISANCE AND CRIME
A. Public nuisance 
Already long ago, in the 1990s, there were complaints about public 
nuisance around coffee shops. In the first comprehensive drug policy 
document in 1995 read “Inhabitants in the vicinity of the coffee shops in 
some municipalities complain about the nuisance in relation to a.o. 
loitering customers, pollution and traffic.”222
The coffee shops in the border regions attracted a lot of customers 
from abroad causing excessive nuisance for neighbors. The nuisance 
consisted of traffic and parking problems, noise and loitering, destruction 
of gardens and cars, bothering people, urinating and vomiting in gardens 
and porches of houses in the neighborhood.223 There were at times 
thousands of customers per day, of which a majority came from abroad. 
For instance:
219 Id. at 35. 
220 ALI PALALI & JAN C. VAN OURS, DISTANCE TO CANNABIS-SHOPS AND AGE OF ONSET OF 
CANNABIS USE 3 (2013). 
221 See van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, supra note 13, at 191. 
222 LOWER HOUSE OF THE PARLIAMENT 1994-1995, File No. 24077 3, DRUGBELEID, NOTA 
‘HET NEDERLANDSE DRUGBELEID: CONTINUÏTEIT EN VERANDERING’ [DRUG POLICY, NOTE 
‘THE DUTCH DRUG POLICY: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE’] 37 (1995) [hereinafter DUTCH 
DRUG POLICY]. 
223 Marianne van Ooyen-Houben et al., Drugsgerelateerde overlast [Drug Related Public 
Nuisanc]), in EVALUATIE VAN HET NEDERLANDSE DRUGSBELEID [EVALUATION OF THE 
DUTCH DRUG POLICY] 305–06 (Margriet van Laar & Marianne van Ooyen-Houben eds., 
2009) (with a report summary in English).  
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ͲAbout 90% of the 2,300-2,900 customers of the two coffee shops 
per day in the city of Terneuzen came from Belgium or France in 
2007;224
Ͳ in Venlo 75% of the more than eight thousand visitors of the five 
coffee shops per day came from Germany in 2006; in 2009, 64% of the 
4,500-5,000 visitors came from Germany;225
Ͳ in Maastricht about 69% of the coffee shop visitors (14 coffee 
shops, 2.1 million visitors per year) came from abroad in 2008;226
Ͳ in Breda about half of the visitors of the eight coffee shops came 
from Belgium or France in 2011;227
Ͳ in Bergen op Zoom-Roosendaal came thousands of drug tourists 
from Belgium or France to visit the (four) coffee shops in 2008.228
These cities all took measures against the drug tourism and nuisance. 
We described the cases of Venlo (project “Hektor”), Terneuzen (closure 
of the biggest coffee shop “Checkpoint”) and Maastricht (local efforts to 
relocate and to ban nonresidents failed, finally it implemented the 
national residence criterion) already. Bergen op Zoom-Roosendaal 
decided in 2009 to close all eight coffee shops.229 These interventions—
closures and relocations—worked out generally well, also because they 
were embedded in a broader project with enforcement and 
communication towards foreign visitors.230 Displacement occurred, but 
stayed limited.231
Measures against drug tourism and nuisance were also taken on the 
national level. To prevent drug tourists to buy bigger amounts of 
cannabis, the tolerated amount of sale per transaction in coffee shops was 
224 BIELEMAN & NAAYER, supra note 192, at 24; van Ooyen-Houben & van der Giessen, 
supra note 38, at 34. 
225 SNIPPE ET AL. (2012), supra note 150, at 38.  
226 NIJKAMP ET AL., supra note 164, at 16.  
227 GEMEENTE BREDA, MONITOR OMVORMING COFFEESHOPS TOT BESLOTEN CLUBS IN 
BREDA, RESULTATEN METINGEN JUNI 2012 [MUNICIPALITY OF BREDA, MONITOR OF THE 
TRANSFERENCE OF COFFEE SHOPS INTO PRIVATE CLUBS, RESULTS OF ASSESSMENTS JUNE 
2012] 14 (2012). 
228 E.J. VAN DER TORRE ET AL., DRUGSTOERISTEN IN ROOSENDAAL EN BERGEN OP ZOOM:
TELLINGEN [DRUG TOURISTS IN ROOSENDAAL AND BERGEN OP ZOOM: COUNTINGS] 18, 24
(2008).
229 van Ooyen-Houben & van der Giessen, supra note 38, at 39.
230 Id.
231 Id.
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reduced from 30 grams to 5 grams, the maximum stash in a coffee shop 
was determined at 500 grams, coffee shops were not allowed to sell 
alcohol any more, youngsters under 18 were not allowed to enter a coffee 
shop, and coffee shops became restricted in their commercial 
activities.232 The mayor got more judicial authorizations to act against 
violations of the tolerance criteria by coffee shops.233 In 2012 the 
residence criterion was added to the tolerance criteria, which gives 
municipalities the option to ban nonresidents from the coffee shops234
and thus reduce public nuisance.235 Coffee shops themselves also 
intervened in the nuisance: they kept an eye on what happened in their 
direct vicinity or appointed staff to prevent nuisance outside their shop.236
As a result, the nuisance is better under control and, overall, stable.237
Most municipalities do not have any nuisance from their coffee shops.238
232 DUTCH DRUG POLICY, 37–39.
233Art 13b Wet RO (Neth.). 
234 Aanwijzing Opiumwet 3 Jan. 2015, § 3.4 (2015).  
235 M. van der Giessen & M. van Ooyen-Houben, Het Besloten club- en het 
Ingezetenencriterium uiteengerafeld: de interventielogica achter de criteria [The Private 
Club and the Residence Criterion Analyzed: the Intervention Logic Behind the Criteria], 
in HET BESLOTEN CLUB- EN HET INGEZETENENCRITERIUM VOOR COFFEESHOPS [THE
PRIVATE CLUB AND THE RESIDENCE CRITERION FOR COFFEE SHOPS] 50 (M.M.J. van 
Ooyen-Houben et al. eds., 2013) (with a report summary in English). 
236 van Ooyen-Houben, supra note 54, at 37; M. van Ooyen-Houben & M. van der 
Giessen, De problematiek volgens de betrokken actoren [The Problems According to 
Stakeholders], in HET BESLOTEN CLUB- EN HET INGEZETENENCRITERIUM VOOR 
COFFEESHOPS [THE PRIVATE CLUB AND THE RESIDENCE CRITERION FOR COFFEE SHOPS] 73–
74 (M. van Ooyen-Houben et al. eds., 2013) (with a report summary in English);  M. van 
Ooyen-Houben & M. van der Giessen, De implementatie van de B- en I-criteria volgens 
de betrokken actoren: resultaten van de procesevaluatie [The Implementation of the 
Private Club and the Residence Criteria], in HET BESLOTEN CLUB- EN HET 
INGEZETENENCRITERIUM VOOR COFFEESHOPS [THE PRIVATE CLUB AND THE RESIDENCE 
CRITERION FOR COFFEE SHOPS] 103 (M. van Ooyen-Houben et al. eds., 2013) (with a 
report summary in English); Thaddeus Müller et al., Het verplaatsen van coffeeshops 
vanuit een criminologisch perspectief [Moving Coffee Shops from a Criminological 
Perspective], in VERKENNING VERPLAATSINGSMOGELIJKHEDEN COFFEESHOPS IN DE 
GEMEENTE ROTTERDAM [EXPLORATION POSSIBILITIES COFFEE SHOPS IN THE MUNICIPALITY
OF ROTTERDAM] 54-55 (2012).
237 ANNEMIEKE BENSCHOP ET AL., COFFEESHOPS, TOERISME, OVERLAST EN ILLEGALE 
VERKOOP VAN SOFTDRUGS, 2014 [COFFEE SHOPS, TOURISM, NUISANCE AND ILLEGAL SALE 
OF SOFT DRUGS, 2014) 37 (2015); MENNES ET AL., supra note 173, at I, II, 44; RALPH 
MENNES ET AL., LOKAAL GEZIEN, VERDIEPINGSSTUDIE MONITOR ONTWIKKELINGEN 
COFFEESHOPBELEID 2015/16 [LOCAL VIEW, IN-DEPTH STUDY OF THE MONITOR OF 
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In an evaluation study of measures against coffee shop related nuisance 
in ten municipalities in 2012, there was even not enough public nuisance 
in most municipalities to assess changes and effectiveness of the 
measures in a statistically reliable way.239 The lack of nuisance as a 
problem explains why most municipalities did not feel any need for the 
private club and the residence criterion in 2012240 or do not implement it 
in practice.241 There are, though, differences between municipalities; 
most nuisances are still reported in the south of the country.242 Recently, 
one municipality there decided to start implementing the residence 
criterion because of increasing drug tourism and nuisance.243  In places 
where nuisance occurs, this consists mainly of traffic and parking 
nuisances, or the presence of dealers and drug runners in the vicinity of 
the coffee shops.244
B. Crime 
Coffee shops are regarded as a business branch with risks of 
involvement of crime. The most vulnerable spot, the Achilles heel, is the 
DEVELOPMENTS IN COFFEE SHOP POLICY 2015/16) 80–81, 87 (2016) (with a report 
summary in English). 
238 DENNIS DE HOOG ET AL., OVERLASTBEPERKENDE MAATREGELEN RONDOM COFFEESHOPS:
LESSEN VOOR LOKALE PARTNERS [MEASURES TO REDUCE NUISANCE AROUND COFFEE 
SHOPS: LESSONS FOR LOCAL PARTNERS] 1 (2012); van Ooyen-Houben & van der Giessen, 
supra note 236, at 73–74; MENNES ET AL., supra note 173, at 41.
239 DE HOOG ET AL., supra note 238, at 1.  
240 van Ooyen-Houben & van der Giessen, supra note 236, at 75, 88.  
241 M. van Ooyen-Houben & M. van der Giessen, De implementatie van het 
Ingezetenencriterium volgens de betrokken actoren [The Implementation of the Residence 
Criterion According to Stakeholders], in COFFEESHOPS, TOERISTEN EN LOKALE MARKT,
EVALUATIE VAN HET BESLOTEN CLUB- EN HET INGEZETENENCRITERIUM VOOR COFFEESHOPS 
[COFFEE SHOPS, TOURISTS AND LOCAL MARKETS, EVALUATION OF THE PRIVATE CLUB AND 
THE RESIDENCE CRITERION) 53–54 (M. van Ooyen-Houben et al. eds., 2014) (with a 
report summary in English); BENSCHOP ET AL., supra note 237, at 25, 34; MENNES ET AL.,
supra note 173, at 28–29, 41–42. 
242 MENNES ET AL., supra note 173, at 17–20.  
243 R. MENNES, HET INGEZETENENCRITERIUM VOOR COFFEESHOPS IN SITTARD-GELEEN [THE
RESIDENCE CRITERION FOR COFFEE SHOPS IN SITTARD-GELEEN] 1 (2017). 
244 BENSCHOP ET AL., supra note 237, at 37; MENNES ET AL., supra note 241, at 42.  
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purchase of cannabis.245 The regulation of the sale of cannabis does not 
cover the so-called “back door” of the coffee shops, where the supply of 
cannabis takes place. We know little about what happens there. The 
police turn a blind eye to the “back door,” as long as the supply is low 
profile and not too visible.246 Whereas a coffee shop is not allowed to 
have more than 500 grams in stock at any given moment, this small-scale 
supply takes place discretely several times a day when more is needed.247
A coffee shop does not pay value added tax (VAT) over its cannabis 
sales because these activities are illegal and no VAT can be applied on 
such activities.248 A coffee shop does pay income tax and has to keep an 
administration about sourcing and sales, but whereas the ‘back door’ is a 
‘black box’ nobody can check what was bought and what prices were 
paid for the cannabis.249 This means that the suppliers at the “back door” 
are uncontrollable for authorities or taxes and that the insight in benefits 
is only fragmentary, even for the tax authorities.250 In cases of cannabis 
245 See, e.g., ANTONIUS JOHANNES GERHARDUS TIJHUIS, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND THE 
INTERFACE BETWEEN LEGAL AND ILLEGAL ACTORS 67, 74 (2006); see, e.g., BOEKHOUT 
VAN SOLINGE, supra note 30, at 138. 
246 MEIN & VAN OOYEN-HOUBEN, supra note 78, at 29. Investigation and prosecution of 
organized crime in relation to cannabis cultivation and of professional cannabis 
cultivation is, however, a priority area for police and Public Prosecutor, as is the 
dismantlement of individual cannabis cultivation sites. See, e.g. See, e.g. I.W. Opstelten, 
Brief Regering, Nationaal Dreigingsbeeld Georganiseerde Criminaliteit 2012 en Vierde 
rapportage op basis van de Monitor georganiseerde criminaliteit, in BESTRIJDING 
GEORGANISEERDE criminaliteit [Letter of the Government, National Threat Assessment 
Organized Crime and Fourth Report Based on the Monitor Organized Crime, in THE
COMBAT OF ORGANIZED CRIME], Lower House of Parliament File No 29911 79 (2013); 
I.W. Opstelten, Brief Regering, Intensivering aanpak ondermijnende en georganiseerde 
criminaliteit Zuid-Nederland, in BESTRIJDING GEORGANISEERDE CRIMINALITEIT [Letter of 
the Government, Intensification of enforcement of undermining and organized crime in 
the South of the Netherlands, in THE COMBAT OF ORGANIZED CRIME], Lower House of the 
Parliament File No 29911 93 (2014); I.W. Opstelten, Brief Regering, Toezeggingen ter 
zake het Algemeen Overleg Coffeeshopbeleid over de aanpak van de hennepteelt, in 
DRUGBELEID [Letter of the Government, Promises with Regard to the General 
Deliberations Coffee Shop Policy About the Combat of Cannabis Cultivation, in DRUG
POLICY], Lower House of the Parliament. File No 24077 321 (2014).  
247 MEIN & VAN OOYEN-HOUBEN, supra note 78, at 34–35. 
248 PROJECTGROEP EMERGO, EMERGO: DE GEZAMENLIJKE AANPAK VAN DE ZWARE 
(GEORGANISEERDE) MISDAAD IN HET HART VAN AMSTERDAM [EMERGO: THE JOINT COMBAT
OF THE SERIOUS (ORGANIZED) CRIME IN THE HEART OF AMSTERDAM] 25, 191–92 (2011). 
249 Id.
250 Id.
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cultivation or violation of the stock-rule by coffee shops, the police do 
not do any deep investigation into the interweaving.251 This makes our 
insight gritty.  
This supply is a criminal act, which implies that coffee shops have to 
deal with criminals for their supply. How far coffee shop owners or their 
personnel are involved in supply or in (organized) criminal networks that 
cultivate cannabis is not clear. Research into (31 of the 74) coffee shops 
in the center of Amsterdam indicated that some of them were indeed 
involved, but others were not.252 Some authors argue that the lenient 
policy toward coffee shops fostered the growth of widespread cannabis 
cultivation in the Netherlands.253
Despite the lack of exact figures about the profits of coffee shops, it is 
clear that a lot of money is involved in cannabis cultivation, as well as in 
the retail sale of cannabis.254 The turnover of coffee shops was estimated 
(in 2006) at a total of 211 to 283 million euros.255 In 2013, the total 
turnover over of the then 606 coffee shops was estimated to be between € 
251 Id. at 193. 
252 Id. at 195–97. 
253 JANSEN, supra note 8, at 106; FIJNAUT & DE RUYVER, supra note 84, at 125; E.R.
KLEEMANS ET AL., GEORGANISEERDE CRIMINALITEIT IN NEDERLAND: TWEEDE RAPPORTAGE 
OP BASIS VAN DE WODC-MONITOR [ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE NETHERLANDS: SECOND 
REPORT BASED ON THE WODC-MONITOR], 71 (2002) (with a report summary in English); 
BOEKHOUT VAN SOLINGE, supra note 30, at 134–35. 
254 See generally B. Bieleman & J. Snippe, Coffeeshops en criminaliteit [Coffeeshops and 
Criminality], 32 JUSTITIËLE VERKENNINGEN 46 (2006); Marten van de Wier, Nederlandse 
coffeeshops zetten één miljard euro om [Dutch Coffeeshops have a Turnover of One 
Billion Euros], TROUW (Jan. 2, 2016 7:00 AM); PROJECTGROEP EMERGO, supra note 248, 
at 192; van der Giessen et al., supra note 113, at 104, 107; A.W.M. VAN DER HEIJDEN, DE
CANNABISMARKT IN NEDERLAND: RAMING VAN AANVOER, PRODUCTIE, CONSUMPTIE EN 
UITVOER [THE CANNABIS MARKET IN THE NETHERLANDS: ESTIMATE OF SUPPLY,
PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND EXPORT] 26, 32, 50, 53 (2006); FLOOR JANSEN,
GEORGANISEERDE CRIMINALITEIT: CRIMINALITEITSBEELDANALYSE 2012 [ORGANIZED 
CRIME: CRIME ANALYSIS 2012) 59–60, 63–64 (2012); N. MAALSTÉ & T. BLOK,
BINNENLANDSE CANNABISMARKT: ONDERZOEK NAAR DE HOEVEELHEID CANNABIS DIE IN 
2013 VIA COFFEESHOPS OP DE NEDERLANDSE MARKT KWAM [DOMESTIC CANNABIS
MARKET: STUDY INTO THE AMOUNT OF CANNABIS THAT CAME ON THE MARKET IN THE 
NETHERLANDS VIA COFFEE SHOPS IN 2013] 9, 11 (2014); A.C.M. SPAPENS ET AL., DE
WERELD ACHTER DE WIETTEELT [THE WORLD BEHIND THE CANNABIS CULTIVATION] 61
(2007).
255 See generally Bieleman & Snippe, supra note 254. 
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875 million and € 1.25 billion (with a 95% confidence interval).256 The 
turnover of 52 coffee shops in the center of Amsterdam in 2007 was an 
average of about € 515,150.40 per coffee shop (according to the tax 
authorities, but the tax returns are not always trustworthy).257 Van der 
Giessen et al. estimate the total annual consumption of domestic 
cannabis (‘nederweed’) at 51 to 78 tons (after Monte Carlo simulation, 
the consumption by non-residents included, 95% confidence interval), 
and the domestic production of cannabis at 271 to 613 tons (after Monte 
Carlo simulation, 95% confidence interval).258 They estimate that 78 to 
91% is exported (after Monte Carlo simulation, the consumption by non-
residents included, 95% confidence interval).259 Van der Heijden 
estimated the prevalence of annual cannabis consumption in the 
Netherlands at 57-76 tons and of nederweed 37-54 tons (most probable 
range) and production at 323 to 766 tons; 88-93% is exported.260 Jansen 
estimated consumption in 2011 at around 65 tons and production at 448 
tons.261 Maalsté and Blok estimate that the coffee shops in the 
Netherlands sold in total about 139 tons of nederweed and about 26 tons 
of hashish in 2013 per year.262 They observe big differences in 
distribution between coffee shops, due to the face that some are small 
and others are very big.263
Despite the differences in amounts estimated, it is clear that a 
reasonable amount of money must be involved in the supply of cannabis 
at the “back door” of the coffee shops. At the same time, the cannabis 
cultivation in the Netherlands became professionalized and criminal 
networks became involved, which implies that coffee shops (to an 
unknown extent) have to deal with those networks.264 Because 
investment via banks is difficult for coffee shops, there is a risk that they 
256 van de Wier, supra note 254. 
257 PROJECTGROEP EMERGO, supra note 248, at 192. 
258 van der Giessen et al., supra note 113, at 104, 107. 
259 Id.
260 VAN DER HEIJDEN, supra note 254, at 26–27, 50, 53. 
261 JANSEN, supra note 254, at 59–60, 63–64. 
262 MAALSTÉ & BLOK, supra note 254, at 9, 11. 
263 Id. 
264 FIJNAUT & DE RUYVER, supra note 84, at 115–16, 120; SPAPENS ET AL., supra note 
254, at 61–80; JANSEN, supra note 254, at 49; J. SNIPPE ET AL., PREVENTIEVE 
DOORLICHTING CANNABIS-SECTOR C.A. [PREVENTIVE INVESTIGATION INTO THE CANNABIS-
BRANCH CUM ANNEXIS] 120 (2004). 
660 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.3 
become involved in money laundering or get dependent from criminal 
investments.265 The municipalities therefore use a license system for 
coffee shops, for which they can screen, on the basis of a law, the 
potential criminal engagement of coffee shop entrepreneurs before a 
license is given.266 It can be assumed that, by implementing this law on 
screening on criminal involvement, investments in coffee shops becomes 
less attractive for criminal networks. 
Another question is whether people working in the coffee shop 
business have a criminal history. Of the 560 persons who worked in a 
coffee shop in the city center of Amsterdam in 2010, 243 (43%) had no 
criminal record; 172 do have a criminal record, but only for minor things 
and 145 (26%) have a relevant criminal record.267 Twenty-one percent of 
their crimes is drug related, 17% concerns traffic crimes and 10% violent 
crimes.268 In total it concerns 1,036 crimes, which is considerable.269
Some entrepreneurs and owners were linked to criminal networks, but 
the extent in which this occurs and the exact nature of the links remains 
unclear.270 Another exploration was carried out in 2004 and indicated that 
relatively many cannabis entrepreneurs (60% of the coffee shops in 
Venlo and 79% of the coffee shops in Amsterdam) have a criminal 
record, mainly with regard to cannabis (like having more than 500 grams 
of cannabis in stock) but also hard drug crimes acquisitive crimes, 
violent crimes and crimes with weapons and munitions.271 No definitive 
conclusions can be drawn about direct links with organized crime. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: A WICKED PROBLEM
The tolerant policy with regard to coffee shops is embedded in a 
health oriented drug policy that wants to keep the risks of drug use as 
low as possible. Coffee shops are assumed to contribute to a separation 
265 Bieleman & Snippe, supra note 255, at 54–55. 
266 See generally Wet bevordering integriteitsbeoordelingen door het Openbaar Bestuur 
[Act to Stimulate Integrity Screenings by Authorities] 20 juini 2002, Stb. 2002, p. 1 
(Neth.).
267 PROJECTGROEP EMERGO, supra note 248, at 194.
268 Id. 
269 Id.
270 Id. at 195–97, 202. 
271 SNIPPE ET AL., supra note 264, at 78–79, 81, 83, 98, 100.
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of the cannabis retail market and the retail market of more dangerous 
drugs, by offering cannabis users a safe place to buy their cannabis. As 
customers of a coffee shop, users will not be marginalized, criminalized 
or exposed to ‘hard drugs.’ Coffee shops fulfill this role. Adverse effects 
on an increase of cannabis use are modest, which can be explained by the 
fact that the prevalence of cannabis use is determined by many other 
factors outside the presence or absence of coffee shops. The first 
conclusion is that, in this respect, the cost-benefit analysis turns out as 
favorable for the coffee shop system. The cannabis user profits from the 
coffee shop system.  
Youngsters, and especially vulnerable youngsters, show a relatively 
high prevalence of use, though. Youngsters also think that cannabis is 
easily available and that the risk of use is low. A direct link to the coffee 
shop system is not observed, but it might play a role in a complex 
interplay of other factors. A second conclusion is that it is important to 
enforce the rules for coffee shops, in order to keep them small-scale and 
modest, in combination with effective prevention programs in schools. 
The Dutch coffee shops system stops at the borders of the 
Netherlands. In neighboring countries, cannabis can only be obtained on 
illegal markets. As a consequence, many foreign users found their way to 
the Dutch coffee shops. They appreciate the existence of coffee shops 
and the geographic accessibility and praise the good quality of the 
cannabis and the broad assortment of cannabis varieties they can buy 
there.272 This ‘drug tourism’ caused public nuisance around coffee shops 
in border regions. Several measures were taken, and the third conclusion 
is that municipalities managed to control the problem. Yet, the 
experiences show that it is not such a good idea to introduce a deviant 
drug policy in an individual country that is so close to neighboring 
countries with more restrictive policies. My fourth conclusion is, 
consequently, that drug policies should be coordinated in an international 
framework. 
The license system with a limited number of licenses per municipality 
in combination with the continuing demand for cannabis make the coffee 
shop business, on the whole, a lucrative one, especially in places with a 
lot of drug tourists. An enormous commercialization occurred. The 
272 DE RUYVER & SURMONT, supra note 192, at 74.  
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license system creates opportunities to control the coffee shops, but on 
the other hand (I conclude) appears to carry the risk of excesses.  
Finally, little is known about the coffee shop’s involvement in 
organized crime and cannabis cultivation. Involvement is observed, but 
our knowledge is incomplete. Whether the system fostered domestic 
cannabis cultivation is not clear either. All we know is that the domestic 
production is wide-spread and, for a large part, meant for export.  
The most curious feature of the system is, in my view (and in the view 
of many others), the halfway regulation. The Netherland’s coffee shop 
policy somehow stuck in the middle of a regulated system. The retail sale 
is regulated with an increasing number of rules on national and local 
level, but the supply stayed completely illegal. A coffee shop has to 
operate between a ‘white’ front door and a ‘black’ back door. The coffee 
shop system as it is encountered a lot of criticism from abroad. It can be 
imagined that policy makers on the national level do not want to stretch 
it even further, even if it would be permissible under international 
treaties. However, it is not a quiet situation. The debate has been going 
on for years. 
The coffee shop system has characteristics of a “wicked problem”: it 
poses a problem that is difficult to solve because of incomplete and 
contradictory information. Every statement has a “but.” Coffee shops 
have their benefits for users, but their exact role with regard to cannabis 
use is difficult to determine. Cannabis can be a harmful drug, more 
harmful than was thought in the 1970s, but less harmful than most other 
drugs. Cannabis cultivation and trafficking became wide-spread, but we 
can only hypothesize about he role of the coffee shops in this 
development. A number of coffee shop entrepreneurs are involved in 
crime and criminal networks, but we do not know to what extent this 
occurs. These “buts” leave room for conflicting viewpoints and 
ideological debates in the Netherlands. Some political parties in the 
Netherlands argue that the system goes too far and that the Netherlands 
should ban coffee shops;273 others (like liberal and left-wing parties in the 
273 FIJNAUT & DE RUYVER, supra note 84, at 165; CHRISTEN DEMOCRATISCH APPEL 
(CDA) [CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC APPEAL], KEUZES VOOR EEN BETER NEDERLAND,
VERKIEZINGSPROGRAMMA 2017-2021 [CHOICES FOR BETTER NETHERLANDS: POLITICAL
PROGRAM 2017-2021] 29 (2017); CHRISTENUNIE [CHRISTIAN UNION], HOOPVOL 
REALISTISCH, VOORSTELLEN VOOR EEN SAMENLEVING MET TOEKOMST,
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Netherlands and the majority of municipalities with coffee shops) argue 
that it does not go far enough and that the regulation (or even 
legalization) should include the supply of the shops.274 A bill from the 
liberal party Democrats 66 to regulate the supply to the coffee shops by a 
system in which not only coffee shops, but also the cultivation and the 
sales for the coffee shops are tolerated was accepted in the Lower House 
of the Dutch parliament in February 2017.275 The bill is now on the 
agenda of the Senate.276
It is difficult to say which direction the system will take in the future. 
Shall the coffee shop system survive? How will the Senate vote about the 
bill to regulate the supply of cannabis to coffee shops? The ideology of 
the ruling parties after the elections in the Netherlands of 2017, in 
combination with international developments (in Uruguay, the US, 
Spain, harmonization on European level), might facilitate a change in 
one direction or the other. Change in the case of coffee shops and their 
supply seems to depend not so much on scientific evidence, but rather on 
the political will of national policy makers. 
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